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BRIEFING 
ON 
THE IGC AND THE DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF THE UNION 
I. SUMMARY 
More democracy, or 'the democratization' of Community acts, is the requirement set out 
in all the texts of the Institutions of the Union and the governments of the Member States 
concerned with the 1996 IGC. This demand is closely linked to the request to improve the 
transparency1 and the efficiency2 of the Union, essential objectives of a revision of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
Although there is unanimity on the need to eliminate the Union's democratic deficit, there 
are differences of opinion as to the areas in which democracy is inadequate as well as to 
the means that must be used to reduce the lack of democracy. Accordingly, the degree 
and intensity with which this objective is pursued are entirely different. 
For example, the United Kingdom seeks greater representativeness in the voting in the 
Council of Ministers and greater participation by national parliaments in the Union's 
legislative process. On the other hand, according to the opinion of the British Government, 
an extension of the EP's powers is unlikely to strengthen democracy. 
This view seems to be shared, at least partially, by France. The French Government is 
more likely to stress the strengthening of the Council of Ministers and the participation of 
national parliaments in the Union's legislative process rather than on any extension of the 
EP's powers. 
On the other hand, most of the other countries, particularly Germany, Austria and Italy, 
call not only for an improvement in the decision-making procedures in the Council, e.g. 
majority voting, but also a strengthening of the EP, above all by improving the codecision 
procedure and its extension, for example, to the third pillar of the TEU. The Netherlands 
advocate more scrutiny by the EP, with particular regard to the budget. Germany, 
Denmark and Sweden are even prepared to grant the EP a genuine right to propose 
legislation. A minority of Member States, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, call for 
the EP to be given the power to dismiss one or more Commissioners without causing the 
entire Commission to resign. 
Most of the Union's institutions also agree that more powers should be granted to the EP, 
for example by means of an extension of the codecision procedure. They also favour 
closer cooperation between the EP and national parliaments. 
1 See Briefing No 18: the IGC and transparency 
2 See Briefiung No 25: the IGC and the effectiveness of the Union 
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This corresponds broadly to the opinion set out in the Justus Lipsius report on the 1996 
IGC. An enhancement of the role of the EP, a strengthening of the role of the national 
parliaments, an improvement in the representative nature of voting in Council and the 
virtual blanket use of majority voting are the recommended means for making the 
European Union more democratic. 
On the other hand, J.C. Piris believes that the Maastricht Treaty has already made a 
major contribution to the democratization of the Union, in particular through the enhanced 
role of the EP. It is specifically in the field of the policy on justice and home affairs where 
the author still sees that the powers of the EP can and must be increased. 
As far as the Reflection Group is concerned, strengthening democracy is bound up with 
the challenge to bring the Union closer to the European citizen and to ensure respect for 
fundamental rights. 
At institutional level, the Reflection Group comes out in favour of simplifying and reducing 
the number of legislative procedures. Accordingly, monitoring of their governments by 
national parliaments must be strengthened and forms of cooperation with Community 
institutions developed for subjects falling within the remit of the Union. 
II. THE AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE 
The 'democratization' of the European Union is one of the fundamentals of the agenda for 
the 1996 IGC. Article 189b(8) of the Treaty establishing the European Community lays 
down that 'the scope of the [codecision] procedure ... may be widened .... on the basis of 
a report to be submitted to the Council by the Commission by 1996 at the latest'. 
Accordingly, the Corfu European Council of June 1994 mandated the Reflection Group 
to consider and draw up ideas concerning the provisions of the TEU scheduled for revision 
as well as other possible improvements in a spirit of democracy and openness. 
This mandate was confirmed and spelt out in detail by the European Council Summit in 
Cannes (26 and 27 July 1995) which laid down certain priorities to be dealt with by the 
Reflection Group, including the need to strengthen the efficiency, the democratic nature 
and the transparency of the institutions. 
The European Council in Madrid (15 and 16 December 1995) "recieved with great 
interest" the Report drawn up by the Reflection Group and confirmed the 
Presidency Conclusions of Cannes. 
Finally, the Turin European Council (29 March 1996), which officially opened the 
IGC, demanded that the Conference should examine: 
• the most effective means of simplifying legislative procedures and making them 
clearer and more transparent; 
• the possibility of widening the scope of codecision in truly legislative matters; 
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• 
• question the role of the European Parliament besides its legislative powers, as 
well as its composition and the uniform procedure of its election; and 
- how and to what extend national parliaments could better contribute to the 
Union's tasks. 
Ill. SOURCES 
A. INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNION 
1. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
(a) REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TEU1 
'The European Parliament, 
B. whereas at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference the European Union will have 
to face up to a three-fold institutional challenge: 
- the need to tackle a democratic deficit that a growing number of European 
Union citizens find unacceptable, ... 
C. whereas the major deficiencies under the Treaty on European Union are: 
- the lack of openness and full democratic accountability of the Council, notably 
when deciding in legislative matters, ... 
Adopts the following guidelines: 
I. Objectives and policies of the Union •.. 
3.(iv) Democratic accountability for matters which do not form part of the first pillar must 
be shared between the European Parliament and the national parliaments .... 
Stronger and more democratic Union Institutions 
23. Democratic control of EU matters would be best achieved by partnership between 
the European Parliament and the national parliaments .... 
31. . .. and the democratic role of the European Parliament before, during and after the 
negotiating process [concerning international agreements] should be reinforced ... 
1 PE 212.450, 17.5.1995. 
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V. Follow-up measures .•• 
40.(ii) In order to ensure that the process of revision in 1996 is more transparent and 
democratic, the representatives of Parliament in the Reflection Group should stress 
the need of a decisive change in the method of the Treaty revision and of the full 
involvement of Parliament both in the negotiating phase as well as in the ratification 
process; .. .' 
(b) ANNUAL DEBATE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE PROGRESS OF 
THE POLICIES UNDER THE THIRD PILLAR (JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS)1 
Several Members of the European Parliament have criticized the democratic deficit 
in intergovernmental cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, a field 
which is particularly sensitive with regard to the citizen's fundamental rights. They 
feel that the potential provided for in Articles K.3, K.4, K.6 and K.9 for giving a 
Community dimension to the policies involved have not been used or not used to 
the full. 
(c) RESOLUTION ON (i) PARLIAMENT'S OPINION ON THE CONVENING OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE AND (ii) EVALUATION OF THE WORK 
OF THE REFLECTION GROUP AND DEFINITION OF THE POLITICAL 
PRIORITIES OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WITH A VIEW TO THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE2 
In its resolution of 13 March 1996, Parliament again calls for 'decisive progress towards 
a more democratic and more efficient Europe, based on the concept of statutory equality 
of states, thereby guaranteeing that all Member States are on an equal footing in terms 
of participation in the institutions of the Union; progress must be achieved in particular by 
introducing majority voting and a simplified codecision procedure as the general EU 
procedure on legislative matters, and by reinforcing the role of the European Parliament'. 
In relation to Title VI of the TEU, the resolution also calls for 'strengthening of the powers 
of the Commission (right of initiative) and the European Parliament (codecision), in order 
to improve the level of democratic control'. 
(d) RESOLUTION OF 19 JUNE 1996 ON THE FLORENCE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
With view to the European Council in Florence the Parliament confirmed its 
positions. In addition, it expressed its regret that the 'initial discussions on 
institutional matters' were 'marked by a tendency towards preserving the status 
1 Oral Question, Docs. 84-1349 and 1350/95. 
2 PE 216.237/fin. Part A, 13.3.1996. 
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quo'. It stressed that without a 'visible reduction of the democratic deficit of the 
Union' it would not realistically be possible to go ahead with enlargement. 
(e) RESOLUTION OF 17 JANUARY 1996 ON THE GENERAL OUTLINE FOR A 
DRAFT REVISION OF THE TREATIES 
With view to the European Council in Dublin on 13 and 14 December 1996 the Irish 
Presidency had submitted a first outline for a draft revision of the Treaties (see 
below). With this resolution the Parliament comments on this document. 
Concerning the democratic nature of the Union it states 'that the Irish Presidency 
has made a few possible proposals in this regard but, nevertheless, has not 
adequately taken account of the need to reinforce democratic control at EU level. 
Its points of critic are as follows: 
"(i) The text proposes extension of the codecision procedure on the basis of 
objective criteria rather than on a case-by-case basis, but does not draw the 
conclusion that the proposals to extend codecision to the entire area of 
stand art secondary legislation as put forward by the Commission and the 
Parliament is the only proposal on the table and should therefore be followed 
up; 
(li) the Presidency's text completely fails to tackle the issue of: 
the extension of the assent procedure to all constitutional issues such as 
reform of the Treaties, Article 235 and own resources, and also to all 
international agreements; 
the full attainment of budgetary codecision; 
an enhanced European Parliament role in the appointment of the President 
and Members of the Commission; 
a reinforced European Parliament role in nominations, with assent as regards 
appointment to the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors; 
the reform of the existing complex and insufficiently democratic and 
transparent system of comitology; 
the responsibilities of the European Parliament in deliberating on and 
evaluating policies;" 
With certain restrictions, however, the Parliament welcomes the Presidency's 
proposal to simplify the codecision procedure. 
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2. COMMISSION 
REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE TEU1 
Preface 
Stresses that' ... the Union must act democratically, transparently and in a way people can 
understand; .. . 
The Commission is delighted that the Union's democratic legitimacy has been 
strengthened .... In addition to democratic control at the level of the Union, we need to find 
a way to involve national parliaments more directly and visibly .. .' 
Part one: 
DEMOCRACY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE UNION 
. . . 'Consequently, the Treaty has to be assessed primarily in terms of the concept of 
democratic legitimacy .. .' 
With regard to justice and home affairs, the Commission supports greater control by the 
European Parliament. 'Since questions in the area of justice and home affairs are likely 
to have a direct effect on individuals' basic rights and public freedoms, they actually 
warrant a greater degree of parliamentary control ... ' (30) 
The Commission continues: 
... 'Any assessment of the institutional response to the requirement for legitimacy has 
therefore to be positive. However, there has also to be a reservation concerning the 
weakness, not to say the absence, of democratic control at Union level in the fields of 
activity where the intergovernmental process still holds sway'. (39) 
... 'The Union has functioned more democratically, mainly because of the enhanced role 
played by the European Parliament. Its approval of the Commission strengthens the 
Commission's legitimacy. The new codecision procedure has proved operational and 
effective ... It contains the principal ingredients of a balanced legislative regime'. (171) 
(b) COMMISSION OPINION 'REINFORCING POLITICAL UNION AND PREPARING 
FOR ENLARGEMENT'2 
In this statement, the Commission stresses the importance of creating a people's 
Europe, which must be made simpler and more democratic. In the area of justice and 
home affairs, it points out the absence of democratic and judicial review, which it proposes 
1 SEC(95)731 final, 1 0.5.1995. 
2 COM (96) 90, 28.2.1996. 
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should be remedied by making qualified majority voting the rule, giving Parliament a 
greater role and involving the national parliaments more closely in Union affairs. 
(c) COMMISSION REPORT UNDER ARTICLE 189b(8) OF 3 JULY 1996 ON THE 
SCOPE OF THE CODECISION PROCEDURE 
In this Report the Commission addresses the question of how codecision' s scope 
of application might be extended in a manner which does not only enhance the 
European Union's democratic legitimacy but also its efficiency. The Commission 
believes that extending the scope of codecision goes hand in hand with simplifying 
the current structure of this decision-making procedure as well as with combining 
it with qualified-majority voting in the Council of Ministers. Otherwise, it is argued, 
the risk of legislative procedures being blocked would substantially increase. The 
Commission goes on to propose the following approach: 
'2. On purely democratic grounds, codecision should be extended to all the 
Community's legislative activities. But how should this be defined? 
Giving legal definition of a legislative instrument would in practice entail 
moving towards a hierarchy of norms. 
On the other hand, the Commission considers that the ciriteria commonly 
used to define what constitutes a legislative instrument could be used as a 
guideline; it would have no legal effect and would not be formalized in the 
Treaty, but it would make it possible to determine which of the various areas 
in the Treaty should come under codecision and which should not. 
In short, to meet these criteria legislative instruments would have to meet the 
following decription: 
• be directly based on the Treaty; 
• be binding; 
• determine essential elements of Community action in a given area; and 
• be general in scope. 
3. There are two considerations which must be borne in mind: 
4. 
• the Union's legislative activities are governed by the respect of 
subsidiarity, whereby, in the areas where it has competence to act, the 
Union concentrates on the most essential activities; 
• it is customary for instruments in all areas of activity to "delegate" powers 
to take implementing measures, which the codecision procedures is not 
used for. 
The Commission feels that applying the criteria listed in paragraph 2 to each 
of the Community's areas of activities would enable the codecision 
procedure to be used for legislation across the board without the need for 
a general hierarchy of norms to be ·established in the Treaty. 
5. This approach would also bring the Union closer to one of the conference's 
major objectives • simplifying decision-making procedures • by abolishing 
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the cooperation procedure and thereby reducing the number of procedures 
to three.' 
Finally the Commission goes on to define the areas to which codecision would 
apply following the proposed approach and to which areas it would not apply. 
3. COUNCIL 
COUNCIL REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TEU1 
A. Democracy and efficiency 
16. The Council notes that 'the changes made by the TEU reflect the desire to 
reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the institutional system ... 
The new provisions introduced by the TEU, especially those on increasing the 
powers of the European Parliament, sought to establish a firmer basis for the 
~nion's democratic character. The European Parliament's role in this context is an 
essential one; but democratic legitimacy must be the expression of the Union's 
institutional system as a whole'. (16) 
Further on it states: 
'The Council also helps to ensure respect for the democratic functioning of the system, 
insofar as each of its members is politically responsible to the national parliament before 
which he answers for the positions adopted at Union level'. (18) 
4. COURT OF JUSTICE 
REPORT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE 
APPLICATION OF THE TEU (May 1995) 
The report of the Court restricts itself to considerations concerning the functioning of the 
Union at the legal level. 
As regards democratization, it is interesting to note that the Court of Justice sees no 
technical objection to the amendment of Article 173 of the TEU so that the European 
Parliament might bring actions for annulment without having to establish an interest. 
Furthermore, the Court does not oppose the granting to the European Parliament of the 
right to request the opinion of the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 228(6), on the 
compatibility of an envisaged international agreement with the TEU. 
1 5082/1 /95 rev .1 (7), 6.4.1995. 
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The Court doubts, however, whether it would be appropriate to remove to the judicial 
arena disputes which could be settled at a political level. 
5. COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ON THE REVISION OF THE 
MAASTRICHT TREATY1 
The Committee of the Regions 'which is a central pillar of democratic legitimacy' is 
committed to safeguarding and strengthening the principle of subsidiarity. 
'Subsidiarity in general ... strengthens democratic legitimacy in as much as it avoids the 
creation of an excessively centralized European power disconnected from the problems 
of ordinary citizens; .. .' 
'Furthermore, the committee ... considers ... that the revision of the Treaty should be seen 
as an opportunity for deepening Community cooperation in the fields of justice and home 
affairs ... as well as for developing the concept of European citizenship, by incorporating 
a list of fundamental citizens' rights' in the Treaty. 
6. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
THE 1996 IGC AND THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE2 
According to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, the programme for the 
1996 IGC should have as its objective: 
- 'decision-making close to the citizens ... involving them and allowing them to monitor the 
implementation of policies ... (5.1) 
- 'a more democratic structuring of the existing Institutions, which implies ... : 
. increased legislative power for the EP through an extension of the codecision 
procedure; 
. development of the Commission's role as an executive organ of Community interest 
by introducing procedures which underpin its democratic legitimacy .. .' (5.3); 
- 'democratization of the process of economic and monetary union through the wider 
involvement ... of democratic and social professional representative bodies (EP and 
EJC respectively) .. .' (5.5); 
1 CdR 89/95 fin, 20.4.1995. 
2 CES 273/95 fin., 26.4.1995. 
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- ' ... extending qualified majority voting in social matters' (5.7); 
- 'the definition of a legal framework establishing genuine EU citizenship, capable of 
answering European citizens' needs for identity and democratic participation'. (5.8); 
- 'Giving the Community responsibility for justice and home affairs policies which are too 
important ... to be confined to intergovernmental sphere, without democratic checks .. .' 
(5.9). 
7. INTERINSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION ON DEMOCRACY, TRANSPARENCY 
AND SUBSIDIARITY 
The agreements adopted on 25 October 1993 by the Council, Commission and European 
Parliament are aimed at implementing the Treaty on European Union 'and strengthening 
the democratic, transparent nature of the EU'. 
Amongst other things, they provide for the Council to open some of its debates to the 
public, the publication of the outcome of debates and the common positions adopted 
within Council, broader consultations by the Commission, through recourse to Green 
Papers and White Papers, the publication of its work and legislative programme in the 
Official Journal, and improving information of the public and contacts between the 
Commission and individual citizens. 
Given that the agreements 'may be added to or amended ... at the initiative of any of the 
three Institutions', we must regard the declaration as dynamic and evolutionary in nature 
with a view to the revision of the TEU. 
8. REFLECTION GROUP ON THE 19961GC 
REElECTION GROlJP'S REPORT1 
On 5 December 1995 the Reflection Group adopted its final report. A whole chapter 
is devoted to the issue of "an efficient and democratic Union". The Group takes the 
view that democracy implies greater participation by the people in the Institutions of the 
Union and a strengthening of the European Parliament and of the role of the national 
parliaments. 
To that end it argues with regard to the European Parliament that: 
- it is appropriate to fix a maximum number of seats; 
- a uniform electoral procedure is established in all Member States; 
- the EP' s right of initiative is broadly sufficient; 
1 SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21 ), 5.12.1995. 
- 13- PE 166.672 
- the legislative procedures currently in force should be reduced to co-decision, 
assent, and consultation; whereas assent applies to all areas where the Council 
decides with unanimity; 
- it is appropriate to improve and simplify the co-decision procedure without 
changing its nature (it is explicitly stated that one Member opposes extension in 
principle); 
- its role in the appointment of the Commission has to be discussed; 
- its powers in combating fraud and in monitoring the executive powers of the 
institutions should be strengthened; 
- its role in pillar II (Common Foreign and Security Policy) cannot be the same as 
in Community legislation; nevertheless its right to be informed should be better 
developed in practice; 
- in pillar Ill (Justice and Home Affairs) it should be examined where greater 
controll by the Parliament might be necessary. 
According to the report the issue of democratic legitimacy is also important with 
regard to the reform of other institutional bodies. Related on the Council of 
Ministers it is pointed out that: 
- there is broad agreement that voting under the unanimity rule needs the 
supervision by national parliaments; 
• some members are convinced that the extension of qualified-majority voting 
would increase the efficiency of the Union only if its decisions were supported by 
a significant majority of the Union's citizens. 
Concerning the Commission the Group considered that •a suitably constituted 
college of Commissioners is fundamental aspect of the credibility and legitimacy 
of the Commission•. Accordingly discussions about the reform of its composition 
was guided not only by considerations of effectiveness. For example, the option 
of fixing a Commission with fewer Commissioners than the Union has Member 
States would have many advantages in terms of visibility and coherence. On the 
other hand, it would not fullfil the requirement of representing all nationalities. 
9. PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
- THE EUROPEAN UNION TODAY AND TOMORROW. ADAPTING THE EUROPEAN 
UNION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS PEOPLES AND PREPARING IT FOR THE 
FUTURE. A GENERAL OUTLINE FOR A DRAFT REVISION OF THE TREATIES. 
DUBLIN II. 
With view to the European Council in December 1996, on 5 December 1996 the Irish 
Presidency of the European Council submitted this general outline for a draft 
revision of the treaties in order to summarize the results since the beginning of the 
IGC and to provide a basis for the next phase of negotiations. 
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The Presidency acknowledges that the institutions of the Union should function as 
democratically as possible 'so that their representative nature is clearly seen and 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the public is maintained and reinforced'. This implies 
that the 'central role of the European Parliament must be recognized and find full 
expression in the institutional procedures of the Union', mainly by simplifying co-
decision and by extending it to new areas. According to the Presidency, the central 
role of national parliaments should be recognized, too. 
In detail the draft text contains inter alia the following proposals: 
- the nomination of the President of the Commission shall be approved by the 
Parliament; 
- the number of legislation procedures involving the Parliament should be reduced 
to co-decision, consultation and assent; 
co-decision should be extended in its scope of application, preferably on a basis 
of certain criteria, for example as suggested by the Commission and the 
European Parliament 
- with view to future enlargement the number of members of the European 
Parliament should be limited. 
- with regard to an extension of qualified-majorty voting in the Council of 
Ministers it is stated that agreement in this field might be depend on agreement 
to a re-weighting of votes (with the aim of taking into account the size of each 
Member State); 
- concerning the fixing of the number of Members of the Commission it is referred 
to different options; 
- related on the role of national parliaments the report accepts that 'while the 
scrutiny role of national parliaments in relation to the activities of the Union is 
primarily a matter for the internal constitutional organization of each Member 
State, ••• improvements should be made at the level of the European Union to help 
national parliaments to do their job more effectively'. The Presidency suggests 
to annex a Protocol to the Treaty dealing with this question. 
B. GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
1. GERMANY 
In the government declaration made by Chancellor Kohl1 in November 1994, safeguarding 
democratic legitimacy was referred to as one of the four objectives of institutional 
development and of the 1996 IGC. 
According to a note from the Foreign Ministry on the initial reflections concerning the 
positions of the Federal Government dated 24 April 1995, at the 1996 IGC Germany will 
try to attain as one of its major objectives significant improvements in the field of the 
1 Bulletin of the Federal Government Press and Information Office No 108, 14 November 
1994, pp. 990 and 991. 
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... 
democratic legitimacy, efficiency and transparency of the European Union. With this in 
mind, Germany will support greater participation by the European Parliament in the 
decision-making process, in particular through an extension of the codecision procedure. 
This approach was confirmed by the memorandum 'GERMAN AIMS IN THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE', submitted on 26 March 1996, as well as 
with a joint declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Italy and Germany on 15 July 
1995, and two joint Franco-German letters of President Jacques Chirac and 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Pesidency of the European Council (on 6 December 
1995 and on 9 December 1996). 
The Franco-German letters also stresses that national parliaments should be 
involved to a greater extend than hitherto. A provision to that effect should be 
included in the revised Treaty. 
With regard to the Commission the joint letter of December 1996 makes clear that 
Germany and France place more importance on the principle of efficiency than on 
the principle of democracy. In their opinion the 'future size of the Commission 
should be geared to its principle tasks and should in any case have fewer members 
than there are future EU Member States'. 
2. AUSTRIA 
The position of the Austrian government on the democratic nature of the European 
Union can be obtained from a memorandum issued on 26 March 1996 and titled 
'FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS OF AUSTRIA'. In this document it is argued that 
democracy in the European Union demands a different approach than within the 
nation state. Citizens should be directly represented within the European 
Parliament, but Member States, too, should play a strong role in the legislative 
process, the small and medium size countries having a comparatively big weight. 
In order to strengthen the Union's democratic legitimacy the Austrian government 
demands to simplify the legislative procedure (by reducing them to codecision, 
assent and consultation, and by simplifying and extending codecision), and to 
involve national parliaments to a bigger extend by creating cooperative structures 
between European Parliament and national parliaments on the basis of COSAC1• 
According to Austria, the issue of democratic legitimacy is also connected to the 
question of extending qualified-majority voting within the Council of Ministers. On 
a case-by-case basis, the government believes, it should be examined, in which 
fields it might be necessary to continue with legitimacy through unanimity • 
COSAC:Conference des Organes specialises dans les Affaires communautaires, 
which includes the Committees of European affaires of the national parliaments of 
the EU Member States as well as six representatives of the European Parliament 
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Concerning the composition of the Commission, Austria on grounds of legitimacy 
demands that each Member State should have at least one Commissioner. It is 
willing to consider a strengthening of the Parliament's role in the nomination of the 
President of the Commission. 
Concerning the role of the European Parliament in the second and in the third pillar 
of the Union the memorandum is very vage. It seems as if in these fields Austria 
were keen to secure a strong role of the national parliaments. 
3. BELGIUM 
Belgium coordinated its negotiaion positions with the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg in a joint 'BENELUX MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
CONFERENCE'. It was issued on 8 March 1996 and states: 
'The three countries are firm supporters of greater democratic legitimacy in 
decision-making at European level. They therefore favour extending the scope of 
the co-decision procedure to most of the legislative areas in which qualified-
majority voting applies. That procedure should also be simplified as far as possible 
and an attempt should be made to reduce the number of procedures to three: 
opinion, assent and co-decision. The European Parliament should be more closely 
involved in decision-making for the second and third pillars, on the basis of 
suitable information, promtly supplied by the Commission and the Council.' 
In addition, greater accountability to the European Parliament for Commissioners 
is demanded. Concerning the composition of the Commission one national of each 
country is regarded as the minimum. 
Finally, regarding qualified-majority voting in the Council of Ministers itself, it is 
argued that a "population yardstick might be used to make certain that the qualified 
majority represents a majority of the Union's inhabitants". 
4. DENMARK 
The governmental position was clarified on 11 December 1995 with a memorandum 
called 'BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION· OPEN EUROPE: 19961NTERGOVERNMENTAL 
CONFERENCE'. This official document emphasizes that one of the main issues to 
be dealt with in the IGC were the Union's democratic legitimacy. It goes on to argue 
that the European Parliament should continue to play an important role in the 
decision-making process as a body responsible for democratic scrutiny. Decision-
making procedures should be simplified and reduced so that 'the Parliament 
exercises more uniform influence in the various spheres of activity without 
upsetting the balance between the EU Institutions'. With view to enlargement an 
upper limit of members of the Parliament is considered as necessary. 
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Concerning the composition of the Commission the Danish government thinks that 
all Member States should be represented. 
Regarding qualified-majority voting in the Council of Ministers, Denmark is in 
favour of extending its scope of application. This should be directly linked to the 
population of the Union. 
Special importance the Danish government attaches to enhancing the involvement 
of national parliaments. This was demonstrated by the submission of a specific 
proposal on this issue in November 1996, which argues that national parliaments 
should have better access to information on the European Union and its 
institutions. 
5. SPAIN 
The Spanish government displayed its negotiation positions with the memorandum 
'ELEMENTOS PARA UNA POSICION ESPANOLA EN LA CONFERENCEA 
INTERGUBERNAMENTAL DE 1996', which was issued on 28 March 1996. It is 
convinced that the IGC should endow the European Union with more democracy, 
transparency, and efficiency. With regard to the European Parliament proposals are 
supported, which aim at reducing the number of legislative procedures to co-
decision, assent and consultation. In addition, Spain is in favour of simplifying co-
decision and to extend its application to all areas which are currently dealt with on 
the basis of the cooperation procedure. Finally, Parliament's powers related on the 
fight against fraud should be strengthened. 
With regard to national parliaments Spain argues that they exercise powers of 
controll primarely vis-a-vis their national governments. Nevertheless, they should 
have better access to information about the European Union and its institutions. 
Concerning the voting mechanisms in the Council of Ministers the government 
distinguishes between primary and secondary law. In cases of primary law 
unanimity should continue; secondary law it should be decided on with qualified-
majority, as a general rule with few exceptions. Spain does also argue that the form 
of majority-voting should be reformed in order to better reflect the different sizes 
of the Member States. 
Regarding the Commission its composition is regarded as a fundamental aspect 
of its credibility and legitimacy. In considerable detail three different options are 
mentioned: 
• continuing with the present mode (two commissioners for the large countries, 
one for the small ones); · 
• fixing a number of Commissioners below the number of Member States; and 
- giving each country one Commissioner. 
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Spain favours the second option, since this would not only enhance the 
Commission's coherence and efficiency but also its collegiality and independence. 
The positions concerning the Parliament were confirmed in September 1996 by a 
specific Spanish proposal dealing with the co-decision procedure, and on 4 
February 1997 by the document 'NOTA A LA ATENCION DEL DR. JOSE GIL 
ROBLES, PRESIDENTE DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO, SOBRE LA POSICION DE 
ESPANA EN LA CIG EN RELACION CON LOS PODERES Y COMPETENCIAS DEL 
PARLAMENTO EUROPEO'. 
6. FINLAND 
On 14 February 1995, the government submitted to the Finnish Parliament its report on 
the guidelines concerning Finland's European policy. As regards the Community 
institutions, it wants to maintain the current system, i.e. that the Council acts on a proposal 
from the Commission. 
With respect to the second and third pillars, Finland wishes to pursue intergovernmental 
cooperation. However, it is prepared to grant the Union supplementary powers and to 
support improvements in decision-making procedures, provided that the interests of the 
smaller countries are respected. 
This point of view is confirmed in the 'MEMORANDUM OF THE MINISTRIY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS' on the opinions of the Finnish Government concerning the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference, which was published on 18 September 1995. Emphasis 
is laid in the Memorandum on the need to improve democracy in the Union by 
strengthening the European Parliament and the national parliaments in the procedure for 
taking positions and by closer collaboration between those institutions. In the view of the 
Finnish Government, the role of the national parliaments must remain the reference point 
in the campaign to achieve more democracy. 
In a second and final report to parliament on the 1996 IGC titled 'FINLAND'S POINTS 
OF DEPARTURE AND OBJECTIVES AT THE EUROPEAN UNION'S 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE IN 1996' the Finnish Government devotes a 
whole chapter to an efficient and democratic Union. In its view, the European Parliament 
is the only directly elected institution and as such a vital instrument of democracy. The 
Finnish Government is therefore in favour of strengthening Parliament's role in the 
legislative process. On the other hand, however, it is against giving it greater powers 
in procedures to amend the Treaty. This power should rest exclusively with the Member 
States. 
Concerning qualified-majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the report sees the 
possibility of extending it to the social and-environmental fields and to second and 
third pillar matters. 
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With regard to the Commission the Finish government is convinced that 'at least 
one representative in the Commission increases the the Commission's legitimacy, 
authority and opportunities for action and enhances citizen's sense of belonging 
to the Union'. 
7. FRANCE 
On several occassions, notably with the already mentioned joint Franco-German 
letters in December 1995 and in December 1996 (see the chapter referring to 
Germany) the French government expressed its concern for strengthening the 
democratic basis of the European Union. It is important to point out, however, that 
France places at least as much importance on enhancing the role of national 
parliaments as it does with regard to the European Parliament. 
For example, in July 1996 it submitted proposals on how the role of national 
parliaments might be reinforced. By giving national parliaments a greater say, the 
proposal states, the European Union would come closer to its citizens. According 
to the government, this is especially the case with policies so far dealt with in the 
third pillar, that is Home and Justice Affairs. However, the government does not 
argue for the creation of a new institution. It favours the development of flexible 
structures based on COSAC. 
8. GREECE 
On 26 March 1996 the government issued the 'CONTRIBUTION OF CREECE TO THE 
1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE'. With view to enlargement and the 
general gap between the European Union and its citizens, the government argues 
that the IGC should reform the institutions to make them more democratic, 
transparent and efficient. In detail the government is in favour of strengthening the 
Parliament's role by: 
- reducing the legislative procedures to assent, consultation and codecision; 
- applying codecision to all policy areas decided on in the Council of Ministers 
with qualified-majority voting; 
- simplifying the procedure for the adoption of the EU' s budget; 
- giving it the right to elect the President of the Commission on the basis of a list 
presented by the Council of Ministers; 
- reinforcing its powers with regard to scrutinizing the executive organs of the 
Union; 
- giving it the right to participate as an observateur at intergovernmental 
conferences; and 
• limiting its maximum number of seats. 
In addition, Greece is willing to examine proposals for a uniform electoral system 
for the European Parliament. 
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Greece does also argue, that the role of the national parliaments should be 
strengthened by intensifying the contacts between them and the institutions of the 
European Union. 
Concerning the Commission the government is convinced that the election of its 
President would enhance its democratic legitimacy. In addition it demands that 
each Member State nominates at least one commissioner. 
On the question of extending qualified-majority-voting in the Coucil of Ministers 
Greece seems to take a rather restrictive position. It highlights that in all areas 
touching on vital national interests voting on the basis of unanimity should be 
continued. In addition, the govemment believes that the current weigthing of votes 
guaranties the balance between the different countries. On the other hand, 
however, it argues that in all fields decided on by qualified majorities the European 
Parliament should participate on the basis of the codecision procedure. 
In Mai 1996 the Greek government demonstrated its interest in a stronger role of the 
European Parliament by submitting a specific document on this issue. For example it 
discusses, in which way the legislative and non-legislative powers of the 
Parliament might be enhanced. 
9. IRELAND 
Ireland outlined its negotiation positions on 28 March 1996 within a document 
called 'CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ABROAD: IRISH WHITE PAPER ON 
FOREIGN POLICY'. It appears that the govemment is in favour of a strong European 
Parliament. On the one hand the extension of the codecision procedure is 
supported, on the other hand it is stated, that any attempt to undermine the role of 
the European Parliament would be firmly resisted. Also it is commented on voting 
in the Council of Ministers. The government is in favour of extending the provision 
for qualified- majority voting. 
This approach is confirmed by the Whitebook THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
NEW EUROPE. IRELAND'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
CONFERENCE 1996, published in May 1996. 
10. ITALY 
The Italian government continues on its traditionally pro-integrationist path. This 
becomes clear with several documents issued concerning the 1996 IGC: 
• MEMORANDUM BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ANTIONIO MARTINO, OF 12 
OCTOBER1994; . 
• COMMUNICATION OF 23 FEBRUARY 1995 ON THE GUIDELINES FOR ITALIAN 
EXTERNAL EXTERNAL POLICY; 
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• COMMUNICATION OF 23 MAY 1995 ON THE IGC AND THE REVISION OF THE 
TREATY OF MAASTRICHT; 
• JOINT DECLARATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ITALY AND GERMANY, 
15 JULY 1995; 
• POSITION OF THE IT AllAN GOVERNMENT ON THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
CONFERENCE FOR THE REVISION OF THE TREATIES, ROME, 18 MARCH 1996 
In these documents, the Italian Government comes out in favour of general application of 
majority voting, on condition that the weighting of votes within the Council is amended. To 
ensure greater democratic legitimacy, it proposes voting by double majority, of the 
Member States and of their population. 
Democracy for the Italian Government, means above all granting greater legislative 
powers to the European Parliament by simplifying procedures through a hierarchy of acts. 
Acts of a legislative nature should be adopted in the Council by majority vote and should 
be the subject of codecision of the European Parliament. 
In addition better involvement of the national parliaments in Community policy by more 
frequent contacts and exchanges of information with the European Parliament is 
envisaged as well as a more significant role of the European Parliament in the 
Union's external and security policy. A greater role in Justice and Home Affairs is 
indirectly advocated, since the government supports the transfer of policies in this 
field to pillar I. 
Finally, concerning the composition of the Commission an approach is favoured 
which fixes the number of Commissioners below the number of Member States. 
11. LUXEMBOURG 
For Luxembourg's negotiation positions see the 'BENELUX MEMORANDUM ON 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE' referred to in the chapter dealing with 
Belgium. However, already with the 'AIDE-MEMOIRE DU GOVERNMENT 
LUXEMBOURGOIES SUR LA CONFERENCE INTERGOUVERNMENTALE DE 1996', 
issued on 30 June 1995, Luxembourg made clear, that it supports a more 
integrated, more mutually supportive and more democratic Europe. 
12. NETHERLANDS 
For the dutch negotiation positions see the 'BENELUX MEMORANDUM ON THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE' referred to in the chapter dealing with 
Belgium. 
However, the Dutch position concerning· the democratic nature of the Union has 
been clarified in more than only one document. In 1995 the government issued 
memorandums: 
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- on the enlargement of the Union, possibilities and obstacles (14 November 1994), 
- on cooperation in the field of external policy, security and defence (30 March 1995), 
- on cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (23 May 1995), and 
- on the institutional reform of the European Union (12 July 1995). 
In March 1996 this collection was completed with a document titled 'BETWEEN 
MADRID AND TURIN: DUTCH PRIORITIES ON THE EVE OF THE 19961GC'. 
All these documents advocate strengthening the European Parliament's role. In 
addition the demand is expressed to give national governments greater influence 
on decisions of the Union and greater scrutiny of their implementation. 
13. PORTUGAL 
In March 1996 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a memorandum titled 
'PORTUGAL AND THE INTERTGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE FOR THE REVISION 
OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION' • It was produced by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Regarding institutional reform it takes a rather restrictive positions. 
Portugal is opposed to any change in the present system of weighting of votes, which it 
feels has worked well. Decision-making should be simplified by abolishing the cooperation 
procedure and rationalizing codecision. The national parliaments should be involved to a 
greater extent in second and third pillar matters but without disrupting the present 
institutional balance. The report recommends extending the COSAC system which brings 
together the national parliaments and the European Parliament. Concerning legitimacy 
with regards to the Commission the government continues to favour the principle 
that every member state nominates at least one commissioner. 
14. UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom clarified its position on the democratic nature with 'A 
PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS. THE BRITISH APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 1996', presented in March 1996. It argues, 
that not the European Parliament but national parliaments are the main source of 
the European Union's democratic legitimacy, especially with regard to 
intergovernmental cooperation in foreign and security policy as well as in home 
and justice affaires. Accordingly, 'the government does not feel ••• that the 
European Parliaments needs new powers'. 'It was given new rights in the Maastricht 
Treaty, for example to appopint an Ombudsman, to set up temporary committees 
of inquiry, and to participate more fully in the legislative process through the 
codecision procedure. The European Parliament has been slow to use these 
powers effectively ••• Conciliation under the codecision procedure ••• is not yet 
operating smoothly. The European Parliament has sometimes used its poweres 
under this procedure irresponsibly ••. The Government believes that if the European 
Parliament is to win public trust and confidence, it will need to demonstrate that it 
has been using its new powers responsibly." 
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For the British government the issue of democratic legitimacy is also important as 
regards qualified-majority voting in the Council of Ministers. It argues that by one 
way or another the voting procedure should take into account the size of the 
population of each Member State. 
• 15. SWEDEN 
In July 1995, SWEDEN submitted an initial 'NOTE ON SWEDEN'S PRINCIPLE 
INTERESTS WITH A VIEW TO THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE'. It 
stressed Sweden's intention to work for a more democratic, supportive and open 
Europe. On 30 November 1995 this document was follwed by a 'WRITTEN 
COMMUNICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THE 19961NTERGOVERNMENTAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'. Here democratic legitimacy is regarded 
as an important issue, too. However, a rather intergovernmentalist approach is 
adopted. 
According to Sweden, the European Parliament should continue to play an 
important role in the decision-making procedures of the Union. Wether this role 
should be strengthend, does not become clear. Explicitly only a strengthening of 
its competences in controlling the finances of the Union and with regard to policies 
in the domaine of justice and home affairs is supported. Regarding the different 
procedures of legislation it is only mentioned, that they should be simplified and 
made more comprehensible for the citizens of the Union. In addition, it is argued 
that the role of the national parliaments should be fostered. 
The document attaches special importance to transparency, including public access 
to official documents for ordinary citizens, which is at the basis of any democratic control. 
A more open, more comprehensible and more efficient Union would, the Swedish 
Government feels, be the precondition for the Union to be more readily accepted by its 
citizens. 
********** 
For any further information on this briefing, please contact: 
MrJ. Javier FERNANDEZ I Mr. Andreas LAUTZ, Task Force 19961GC, 
Tel.: 4300-275812442- Fax: 4300-9027 (LUX). 
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